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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 30

NOVEMBER 1977

NUMBER 6

Vertical Divestiture of the Petroleum
Majors: An Affirmative Case
Walter Adams*
In October of 1976, the Vanderbilt Law Review published an article
on vertical divestiture of the petroleum industry by Mr. Stark Ritchie,
general counsel for the American PetroleumInstitute. In his article,Mr.
Ritchie examined the economic justificationsfor vertical integrationin
the oil industry, suggested several consequences of divestiture, and concluded that the remedy would be an inappropriate and inefficient
method of increasing competition in the industry. In response to that
article,ProfessorAdams examines the concentrationof economic power
in the petroleum industry, the relationshipof vertical integrationto the
exercise of horizontal control, and the merits of the efficiency rationale
for vertical integration.He concludes thatfunctional verticaldivestiture
would be both technically and financially feasible and in the public
interest.
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INTRODUCTION

On September 30, 1940, the Department of Justice filed a massive antitrust case against twenty-two major oil companies, 379 of
* Distinguished University Professor, Professor of Economics, and Past President, Michigan State University; member of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws (1953-1955). B.A., Brooklyn College, 1942; M.A., 1946, Ph.D., 1947, Yale
University.
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their subsidiaries and affiliates, and the American Petroleum Institute (which Clarence Darrow had described in 1934 as "the switch
board for the controlling companies").' The Department articulated
the rationale for filing this comprehensive structural case, which
came to be known as the Mother Hubbardcase, as follows:
This proceeding is being instituted under the Department's policy of taking up in a single investigation or proceeding all of the restraints which affect

the distribution of a product from the raw material to the consumer. Only in
this way can economic results be achieved. Piecemeal prosecutions against
segments of an industry are both costly and inconclusive. They do not raise
the fundamental issues which the Court should decide, and therefore do not
clarify the law. They allow restraints of trade to flourish in one segment of the
industry while they are being prosecuted in another.
In the past 10 years, the Department has been flooded with complaints
from independents and consumers against various practices in the oil industry.
These complaints have resulted in a series of piecemeal prosecutions in all of
which the Government has been successful. Yet in spite of the success of these
prosecutions, the complaints continue, prices are still inflexible, independent
enterprise is still under a handicap, because the cases applied only to segments
rather than to the entire structure of the industry.
For this reason the present action is brought. It will eventually present to
the Supreme Court of the United States for final decision all of the issues with
respect to the reasonableness of the present vast combinations in the produc2
tion, transportation, refining, and distribution of petroleum products.

The complaint as originally drafted asked that the twenty-two principal defendants be ordered to divest their transportation and marketing facilities. With the outbreak of war in Europe and the United
States' imminent involvement in the conflict, however, the Attorney General agreed to delete the request for structural relief from
the complaint. 3 Like so many other cases of great pitch and mo1. A. SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS 202 (1975).
2. Consent Decree Program of the Department of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,85th Cong., 1st Sess. 123-24 (1957),
quoted in SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PETROLEUM INDUSTRY COMPETITION ACT OF 1976,
S. REP. No. 1005, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1976) [hereinafter cited as PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
COMPETITION ACT REPORT]. This report makes a cogently reasoned case, replete with documentary references, in favor of vertical divestiture.
3. Prior to filing the case, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson submitted the complaint
to the Council of National Defense. The Council in turn referred it to its Oil Industry Advisory
Commission, nine of whose eleven members were connected with either Jersey Standard
(Exxon) or Shell. Both of these companies, of course, were parties to the case and it
came as no surprise that the advisory commission found that divestiture of transportation and marketing would adversely affect the defense effort. Any effort at using the
antitrust laws to restructure the industry would, in their words, "becloud relationships
between the Government and Industry." Attorney General Jackson acquiesced in the
Commission's report and deleted the request for structural relief from the complaint.
PEROLEUM INDUSTRY COMPETITION ACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 105.
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ment, the Mother Hubbard case eventually was settled by a pusilanimous consent decree. 4
On July 18, 1973, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint against the eight largest domestic oil companies. 5 The complaint in In re Exxon Corp. charged the companies with maintaining
and reinforcing "a noncompetitive market structure" in the refining
industry on the East and Gulf coasts through their control of crude
oil and crude transportation. In language reminiscent of the Mother
Hubbard case, the Commission stated the rationale for its action as

follows:
The history of the Federal Trade Commission's activity in the petroleum
industry has been characterized by a case-by-case attack on specific anticompetitive marketing practices. This approach has, in general, been of limited success in controlling wasteful marketing practices, dealer coercion, and
the lack of competition in the petroleum industry. Despite the staff's success
in bringing and winning cases before the Commission and in the courts, as well
as obtaining compliance orders, the petroleum industry over the last 50 years
has managed to circumvent the orders in many cases by subtle changes in
policy or practices....
The reason for the limited success of the early petroleum cases is not to
be found in the cases or remedies themselves. The staff did a thorough job in
reseaiching, developing and prosecuting the individual cases. The remedies
applied in each case were directed at the particular abuse. But the practiceby-practice approach to antitrust attack, which sought to correct specific anticompetitive conduct at the marketing level, did not adequately address the
industry's vertically integrated structure or its multi-level behavior. The major
oil companies operate on four levels-crude production, refining, transportation, and marketing. To fashion a remedy for one level without considering the
performance of a company, or the industry, at the other levels, ignores the
market power associated with vertical integration and limited competition.,

As in Mother Hubbard,the antitrust authorities recognized that an
industry's noncompetitive structure militates toward noncompetitive behavior and results in noncompetitive performance. They recognized that, if the goals of the antitrust laws are to be attained,
there is no alternative to structural reorganization of the horizontally and vertically integrated oil oligopoly.
4. For the deplorable record of antitrust versus the petroleum industry and some of the
reasons for it, see Market Performanceand Competition in the PetroleumIndustry:Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, Part 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 370-98
(1973) (testimony of Mark J. Green). See also PETRoLEUM INDUSTRY COMPETITION AcT REPORT,
supra note 2, at 95-124.
5. In re Exxon Corp., 83 F.T.C. 233 (1973).
6. STAFF OF SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., INVESTIGATION OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 4-

5 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as INVESTIGATION OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY].
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More important than this latest antitrust action against the
petroleum industry, however, is the growing awareness in Congress-precipitated in part by the Arab oil embargo of October 1973
and by the subsequent rise in petroleum prices and oil company
profits-that the oil industry for all intents and purposes is operating a worldwide cartel that is not subject to effective regulation by
the government, to the discipline of a competitive marketplace, or
to systematic compulsion to promote the public interest. Policy
makers grow increasingly aware that structural reform of the industry is imperative and that such reform probably will have to be
achieved by legislation rather than by litigation. Accordingly, several divestiture bills were introduced in the Ninety-fourth Congress,
some providing for functional vertical divestiture within the petroleum industry, others for horizontal divestiture to prevent the leading oil companies from dominating alternate sources of energy.7 One
of these bills, S. 2387, was reported out favorably by the Senate
Judiciary Committee on June 15, 1976, but no floor action was
taken. Nevertheless, S. 2387 was attached as a vertical divestiture
amendment to the natural gas deregulation bill, but was defeated
by the narrow margin of only nine votes, forty-five to fifty-four.'
Divestiture had become one of the central issues in congressional
debates during the energy crisis.
This article will examine: first, the concentration of economic
power in the oil industry; second, the manner in which vertical
integration reinforces the horizontal control exercised by the major
oil companies; third, the extent to which prevailing patterns of vertical integration are based on efficiency considerations; and, finally,
whether vertical divestiture is a feasible remedy.
II.

THE CONCENTRATED POWER OF BIG

OIL

Spokesmen for the oil industry claim that it includes some
10,000 producers and that the concentration ratios, especially in
crude oil, are far lower than in other major industries, notably the
automobile, aluminum, computer, and aircraft industries., Commenting on this line of argument, John W. Wilson has observed:
7. E.g., S. 739, S.745, S. 756, S. 1137, S. 1138, and S. 2387, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
dealing with vertical divestiture, and S. 489, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), dealing with
horizontal divestiture.
8. J. BLre, THE CONTROL OF Oi. 382 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Ritchie, Petroleum Dismemberment,29 VAND. L. REv. 1131, 1137-42 (1976).
See also The Petroleum Industry: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1849-1917,
2102-29, 2217-49 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Vertical Integration Hearings].
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Despite its size, conventional concentration ratio measurements indicate that
oil is not particularly concentrated in comparison with other major industries
... . [Wlhile the concentration ratios for the top four or top eight crude
oil producers have increased substantially in the last twenty years, the industry still seems to compare favorably with other leading manufacturing industries, such as automobiles, copper, computers, and aluminum. Thus, argue the
industry's defenders, right-thinking rational men should direct their antitrust
interests toward more critical targets like breakfast cereals and beer, and leave
oil alone."'

At first blush, the oil industry's argument seems persuasive (see
Table 1), but, in fact, it is misleading for a number of reasons.
First, concentration has been increasing steadily since the mid1950's, so that by 1974 the eight largest companies controlled almost
as large a share of crude oil production as did the twenty largest in
1955.
TABLE 1
CONCENTRATION IN CRUDE PRODUCTION

1955

1965

1974

4 Top

21.2%

27.9%

31.1%

8 Top

35.9%

44.6%

54.0%

20 Top

55.7%

63.0%

76.9%

Source: ENERGY ACTION COMMITTEE, DIVESTITURE FACTBOOK 15 (1976).

This trend is explained in part by the massive mergers during the
period, especially mergers between the very largest companies. In
1965, for example, Union Oil (assets of 916.5 million dollars) acquired Pure Oil (assets of 766.1 million dollars). In 1966, Atlantic
Refining (assets of 960.4 million dollars) acquired Richfield (assets
of 499.6 million dollars), and in 1968, Sun Oil (assets of 1,598.5
million dollars) acquired Sunray DX (assets of 749.0 million dollars). In 1969, Atlantic Richfield (assets of 2,450.9 million dollars)
acquired Sinclair (assets of 1,851.3 million dollars). As a result, the
twenty majors of 1955 have become the sixteen majors of today.
Moreover, as Professor Walter Measday points out,
concentration in reserve ownership is even more important, particularly for the
future, than concentration in current production. And the largest companies
control most of the proved reserves. The Federal Trade Commission staff found
that in 1970 our sixteen major companies controlled 77 percent of the net
10. Wilson, Market Structure and Interfirm Integrationin the Petroleum Industry, 9

J.

EcON. IssuEs 324 (1975).
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proved oil reserves in the United States and Canada. The producer has effective control, however, over all of the oil he lifts including the shares for royalty
owners and other nonworking interest holders. In terms of gross reserves, the
sixteen majors may control more than 90 percent of existing proved reserves.,,

Second, the major oil companies are not the run-of-the-mill
corporate giants dominating Fortune's list of the 500 largest industrial corporations. Rather, they are multinationals whose domains extend from Alaska to Kuwait, from Indonesia to Venezuela.
Indeed, the sun never sets on their far-flung empires. Table 2 compares the control over crude production exercised in the United
States, the Middle East, the OPEC countries, and the Free World
by the seven largest majors, the so-called Seven Sisters. 12 The percentage control exercised by all the majors, of course, is even higher
than that of the Seven Sisters. That these companies may no longer
own their erstwhile properties in the OPEC countries is, as shall be
demonstrated, of secondary importance. In practice, they still
control the disposition of the lion's share of the free world's crude
oil production.
Third, the major oil companies are intertwined with one another through a seamless web of interlocking control. 3 They do not
function as independent or competitive units but as cooperative
entities at every strategic point in the industry's integrated structure. They are meshed with one another like strands of spaghetti in
a symbiotic relationship almost inevitably precluding any genuinely
competitive behavior. John W. Wilson, the former chief of the Federal Power Commission's Division of Economic Studies, has explained the significance of bringing "horizontally and vertically juxtaposed firms into close working relationships with each other" as
follows:
They must work together to further their joint interests. Consequently, each
becomes familiar with the others and with each other's operations. Men in
such close working relationships learn to consider one another's interests. This
process of learning to live together is, of course, quite laudable in certain social
and political contexts. The success of our Nation's international relations, for
example, depends greatly upon this process. But it is, most assuredly, not the
kind of institutional setting within which a free market economy can be expected to function efficiently. Real economic competition is made of tougher
stuff
11.

...

In order to function both efficiently and in the public interest, free

Measday, The Petroleum Industry, in THE STRUCTURE

OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 136

(5th ed. W. Adams ed. 1977). For concentration in refining, see BLAIR, supra note 8, at 13136.
12. See also BLAR, supra note 8, at 25-76.
13.

Id. at 136-51; S. RUTTENBERO, THE AMERICAN OIL INDUSTRY: A FAILURE OF ANTI-TRUST

POLICY 41-118 (1973).
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markets must be competitive. This means that the participants must be structurally and behaviorally independent of each other. That precondition, quite
apparently does not apply to the petroleum industry."

The claim, therefore, that the petroleum industry fits the structural
model of effective competition is pure fiction.
TABLE 2
THE SEVEN SISTERS' SHARES OF WORLD CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION

(1972)

Company

Production in
U.S.
(Thou.
b/d)

Produe% of
tion in
total U.S. Middle
proEast' &
duction
Libya
(Thou.
b/d)

% of
total
M.E.' &
Libya
prouction

Produc% of
tion in all total
OPEC
OPEC
(Thou.
prob/d)
duction

Produetion'
% of
world
worldprowide
(excludduetion
ing E.
(excludEurope & ing E.
China)
Europe
& China)
(Thou.

b/d)
(1)

Exxon
Texaco

Socal
Gulf
Mobil

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

1,114
916

9.9
8.1

2,527
2,155

12.9
11.0

4,050
2,674

15.2
10.0

6,145
4,021

14.7
9.6

528
651
457

4.7
5.8
4.1

2,155
1,887
1,178

11.0
9.7
6.0

2,614
2,409
1,477

9.8
9.0
5.5

3,323
3,404
2,399

7.9
8.1
5.7

-

BP

(2)

-

3,903

20.0

4,506

16.9

4,659

11.1

Shell

726

6.5

1,372

7.0

2,877

10.8

5,416

12.9

Total

4,392

39.1

14,165

77.6

20,607

77.1

29,367

70.0

I.
2.

Taken from company annual reports.
Excludes Bahrain.

Source: Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings
Before the Senate Subcomm. on MultinationalCorporationsof the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, Part 4, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1974).

Joint ventures are one manifestation of this symbiotic relationship. A joint venture establishes a community of interest among the
parents and a mechanism for avoiding competition between them.
The mechanism provides an opportunity for foreclosing nonpartners
from access to supplies and/or from access to markets and serves as
a forum in which ostensible competitors can meet to exchange information and coordinate plans with apparent impunity. 5 Most impor14. The Natural Gas Industry: HearingsBefore the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,Part1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1973). The
Wilson evidence on joint ventures, interties, and interlocks deserves detailed attention. Id.
at 478-97.
15. A classic example is the Cal-Tex group of companies through which Texaco and
Standard of California jointly have operated many of their foreign assets for the past 40 years.
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tant, perhaps, the device, at least in the oil industry, thus far has
remained immune from antitrust attack. Table 3 indicates how the
major oil companies use joint ventures, now with one partner and
then with another, in a seemingly infinite set of permutations and
combinations in bidding for federal offshore lease sales. Thus,
Amerada Hess submitted no independent and 168 joint bids during
the period; Getty, no independent and 281 joint bids; Phillips, no
independent and 169 joint bids; and Union, no independent and 245
joint bids.
TABLE 3
JOINT BIDDING IN FEDERAL OFFSHORE LEASE SALES

Number of
independent
Company

bids

Amerada-Hess. ,.

Amoco ........

Atlantic-Richfield

Chevron ........

Cities Service ...

0

...........

6

........

........

........

12

79

7

(1970-72)
Number of
joint bids

Bidding partners

with each

Signal ...................
Louisiana Land .............
Marathon ..............
Texas Eastern .............
Texas Eastern .............
Union ....................
CNG ........
........
Transco.................
Shell ....................
Cities ...................
Getty ...................
Continental.
...........
Mobil ....................
M urphy ............ .......
General American .........
Pennzoil ......
......
Pelto ...
.
......
......
Superior ................
Gulf ...........
.....
.
Burmah ..................
Mesa .....................
Atlantic ....
....
..... .....
Getty .....................
Continental ......
.......
Tenneco ..................

Caltex's profits accounted for 59.5% of Texaco's total profits [in 1975], up sharply from
37.3% and 26.5% in the two previous years. For Socal, the reliance on Caltex also
increased, but less sharply, rising to 63.9%, from 59.3% and 40.5% of Socal's total profits
in the two previous years.
PEMo..UM
ONTELUGENC
WEEKLY, March 22, 1976, at 5. A reasonable person might well
question whether companies whose fortunes are so closely tied to one another are competitors,
as the industry contends, or partners.
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Continental ..............

27

Exxon.................
Getty ...........

80
0

Gulf ...................

17

Marathon................

24

Mobil ..................

8

Phillips ....................

0

Shell ....................

Sun .......................
Texaco ....................
Union ...................

59

115
15
0

1123

Atlantic ...................
Cities ..........
..........
Getty ..
..............
Tenneco ....................
Atlantic ..................
Cities ...
Continental.........
Placid ...................
Superior ..................
Mobil ...................
Pennzoil ..................
Standard Oil of California
(Chevron) .................
Signal ...................
Louisiana Land ..............
Amerada..................
Texas Eastern ..............
Pennzoil ..................
Standard Oil of California
(Chevron) .................
Mesa ...................
Burmah ..................
G ulf ........................
Ashland ...................
Skelly (Getty) ............
Allied Chemicals .............
American Petrofina ..........
Transco ..................
CNG .....................
Standard Oil of Indiana
(Am oco) ..................
Florida Gas ..................
Pennzoil .....................
Tenneco .....................
Am oco .............
........
Texas Eastern ...............
Texas Gas ...................
Florida Gas ................

Source: The Natural Gas Industry: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 481 (1973).

According to Professor Walter Mead, this amounts to bid rigging:
In any given sale, it is obvious that when four firms .

.

. each able to bid

independently, combine to submit a single bid, three interested, potential
bidders have been eliminated; i.e., the combination has restrained trade. This
situation does not differ materially from one of explicit collusion in which four

firms meet in advance of a given sale and decide who among them should bid
(which three should refrain from bidding) for specific leases and, instead of
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competing among themselves, attempt to rotate the winning bids. The principal difference is that explicit collusion is illegal."

Indeed, explicit collusion has been illegal per se since bid rigging
was condemned in 1898 by United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co.17

The major oil companies also use joint ventures in their control
of interstate pipelines (see Table 4). Outside of the United States,
the pattern is similar. In 1952, according to one report, "every important pipeline in existence or even proposed [was] controlled by
the seven principal international oil companies, individually or
jointly."'" The significance of this joint control over pipelines as a
vertical integration lever will be discussed below.
TABLE

4

JOINT VENTURES IN THE OIL PIPELINE INDUSTRY

Pipeline company and
co-owners

Percent
held by
each

Badger Pipeline Co.
(assets = $12,400,000):
34
Atlantic-Richfield ...........
Cities Service ............... 32
Texaco .............. .... . 22
Union Oil ................... 12
Dixie Pipeline Co.
(assets = $46,400,000):
Amoco .................... 12.1
Atlantic-Richfield ........... 7.4
5.0
Cities Service ...............
Continental ................. 4.1
Exxon ..................... 11.1
Mobil ...................... 5.0
Phillips .................. . 14.5
Shell ..................... .. 5.5
Texaco .................... 5.0
Gulf .................... _ 18.2
Transco ................... 3.6
Allied Chemical ............. 8.6
Laurel Pipeline Co.
(assets = $35,900,000):
49.1
Gulf ..................
16.
(1967).
17.
18.

Pipeline company and
co-owners

Percent
held by
each

Texaco .................... 17
Clark .................. ... 11
Marathon .................. 10
Cities Service ............
8
7
Shell
Platte Pipeline Co.
(assets = $33,000,000):
Continental ................ 20
25
Marathon ...................
Union Oil .................. 15
25
Atlantic-Richfield ..........
Gulf ...................... 15
West Shore Pipeline Co.
(assets = $17,600,000):
Shell .......................
20
A moco .............. ....... 16.5
Mobil ..................... 14
9
.........
Texaco ........
Marathon ................... 9
8
Clark ...................
Cities Service ..............
8
Continental ................. 6.5
5.5
Union Oil ...................

Mead, The Competitive Significance of Joint Ventures, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 839
85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
FTC REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CARTEL 27-28 (Comm. Print 1952).
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Texaco ....................

33.9

Sohio ....................
17.0
Colonial Pipeline Co.
(assets
$480,200,000):
Amoco ... ...... ...
.........
14.3
Atlantic-Richfield ..........
1.6
Cities Service ...............
14.0
Continental ................
7.5
Phillips .....................
7.1
Texaco .................
14.3
Gulf ......................
16.8
Sohio ............
.......
9.0
Mobil .....................
11.5
Union Oil ...................
4.0
Plantation Pipeline Co.
(assets = $176,100,000):
Exxon .......
..............
48.8
Shell ......................
24.0
Refiners Oil Corp ..........
27.1
Four Corners Pipeline Co.
(assets = $20,900,000):
Shell ..............
.......
25
Chevron ....................
25
Gulf . .....................
20
Continental .................
10
Atlantic-Richfield ...........
10
Superior ................
_.10
Olympic Pipeline Co.
(assets = $30,700,000):
Shell .....................
43.5
Mobil ....................
29.5
Texaco ....................27.0
Wolverine Pipeline Co.
(assets = $21,800,000):
Union Oil ...................
26
M obil .................
...... 21

Exxon ..........

1125
...........

Wyco Pipeline Co.
(assets = $14,100,000):
Amoco .........
..........
Texaco .....................
M obil .......................
Yellowstone Pipeline Co.
(assets = $16,000,000):
Continental ...............
Exxon .......... ...........
Husky .....................
Union Oil ...................
West Texas Gulf Pipeline Co.
(assets = $19,800,000):
Gulf ......................
Cities Service ...............
Sun .......................
Union Oil ...................
Sohio ......................
Chicap Pipeline Co.
(assets = $25,600,000):
Union Oil ..................
Clark .....................
Amoco ...................
Cook Inlet Pipeline Co.:
Atlantic-Richfield ...........
Marathon ...................
Union Oil ...................
M obil ......................
Texas-New Mexico Pipeline Co.
(assets = $30,500,000):
Texaco .....................
Atlantic-Richfield ...........
Cities Service ...............
Getty ....................

3.5

40
40
20

40
40
6
14

57.7
11.4
12.6
9.0
9.2

43.4
33.2
23.4
20
30
30
20

45
35
10
10

Source: The Natural Gas Industry: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 485 (1973).

Table 5 is a selected list of joint ventures by the major oil
companies outside of the United States. A more comprehensive listing of these ventures and an analysis of their anticompetitive impact is found in the Federal Trade Commission's landmark Report
9
on the InternationalPetroleum Cartel."
19.

Id. at 37-193.
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TABLE 5
SELECTED INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES OF PETROLEUM COMPANIES

Percent Held

Petroleum Company

by Each

(1971 crude production)

Co-owners

Arabian American Oil Co.
(1.45 bil. bbls.)

Texaco
Exxon
Chevron
Mobil

30.00
30.00
30.00
10.00

Iranian Oil Participants, Inc.
(1.3 bil. bbls.)

Mobil
Exxon
Chevron
Texaco
Gulf
B. P.
Shell
Atlantic
Signal
Getty

7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
40.00
14.00
1.67
.83
.83

Iraq Petroleum Co.

B. P.
Shell
Exxon
Mobil

23.750
23.750
11.875
11.875

Kuwait Oil Co., Ltd.
(1.27 bil. bbls.)

Gulf
B. P.

50.00
50.00

Source: Horizontal Integration of the Energy Industry: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Energy of the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
112 (1975).

In all, according to one estimate, joint ventures among the major oil
companies provide approximately 12,000 occasions each year for
ostensible competitors, the joint venture parents, to meet and discuss their common problems and means for resolving them." The
devices are the cement for binding together a loose-knit cartel into
a cozy system of mutual interdependence.
Fourth, as Table 6 demonstrates, the major oil companies are
further bound together by a network of indirect interlocks. With the
exception of Gulf and Socal, as John Blair has observed,
all of the eight largest oil companies were interlocked in 1972 through large
commercial banks with at least one member of the top group. Exxon had four
such interlocks-with Mobil, Standard (Ind.), Texaco, and ARCO. Mobil had

20. S.

RUTTENBERG,

supra note 13, at 61.
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three (with Exxon, Shell, and Texaco), as did Standard of Indiana (with
Exxon, Texaco, and ARCO), as well as Texaco (with Exxon, Mobil, and Standard of Indiana). 2ARCO was interlocked with Exxon, and Standard (Ind.), and
Shell with Mobil.

1

At the very least, Blair concluded, "meeting together presents direc'2
tors of competing companies with potential conflicts of interest.
Fifth, the extensive use of exchange agreements among the
major oil companies not only has cemented their horizontal fraternity, but has given them a powerful weapon against their vertically
nonintegrated competitors. For years the United States has gone
without a meaningful crude oil market. Most crude oil is bought and
sold under exchange agreements by which the buyer of x barrels of
crude oil for his refinery at a particular location agrees to deliver an
equivalent amount to the seller at another location. Walter Measday has pointed out that such exchange agreements "replace a competitive market with a network of bilateral or multilateral barter
transactions from which nonintegrated firms can be easily excluded
as first purchasers of crude and which, by their very nature, must
be less efficient allocators of resources than open markets would
be.,,'

Sixth, oil companies, discontent with their control over only the
oil and natural gas industries, have expanded, largely by merger and
acquisition, into other energy industries. They have acquired coal,
uranium, geothermal, and tar sands reserves to protect their oil and
gas empires from interfuel competition (see Table 7). In 1965, one
oil company (Gulf) engaged in coal operations and produced less
than two percent of the industry's output. Ten years later, eight oil
companies produced more than twenty percent of the industry's
output, and eleven of the sixteen majors controlled more than forty
percent or more of all privately held coal reserves. Companies like
Phillips, Mobil, Shell, Atlantic Richfield (ARCO), and Sun Oil are
all in the multibillion-ton coal-reserve class without ever having
mined a single ton of coal. The biggest risk they face in becoming
major producers, as Senator Kennedy has pointed out, "is that coal
may become technologically obsolete before they could exhaust
'2 4
their reserves.
21. BLAr, supra note 8, at 144-46.
22. Id. at 147.
23. Measday, Feasibility of Petroleum Industry Divestiture, at 8 (paper presented to
Stanford University Institute for Energy Studies, Sept. 1976) (on file at the Vanderbilt Law
Review).
24. Letter from Senator Kennedy to the Senate Judiciary Committee (Aug. 27, 1977)
(on file at the Vanderbilt Law Review) (asking for support of his amendment to the Coal
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6

INDIRECT INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES AMONG MAJOR OIL
COMPANIEs THROUGH COMMERCIAL BANKS (1972)

MAJOR OIL COMPANY
Companies Among Top 8

COMMERCIAL BANK

Source: J. BLAIR, THE CONTROL OF OIL 145 (1976).

The same takeover pattern occurred in the uranium industry.
In 1967, two oil companies engaged in uranoso-uranic oxide (U3 08 )
milling operations with less than twenty-eight percent of the industry's output. In 1972 Exxon and Continental Oil entered the industry, giving oil companies thirty-eight percent of the milling capacity. By 1977 Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) had acquired Anaconda, the
third largest uranium producer, and Standard of Ohio also had
Conversion Bill (S. 977), which would bar future acquisition of competing coal and uranium
resources by major oil companies).
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from fifty
entered the field. As a result, oil companies now control
25
reserves.
industry's
uranium
the
of
percent
fifty-five
to
TABLE 7
ENERGY RESERVES OF TOP THIRTY OIL COMPANIES IN TRILLIONS OF

Company
1. Exxon
2. Texaco
3. Shell
4. Standard of Indiana
5. Gulf
6. Standard of California
7. Atlantic-Richfield
8. Mobil
9. Getty
10. Sun
11. Union
12. Phillips
13. Continental
14. Cities Service
15. Marathon
16, Amerada Hess
17, Tenneco
18, Louisiana Land & Exploration
19. Pennzoil
20, Superior
21. Union Pacific
22. Santa Fe
23. R. J. Reynolds
24. International Paper
25. Kerr-McGee
26. Standard of Ohio
27. General American
28. Ashland
29. American Petrofina
30. Diamond Shamrock

1975 Net
Domestic
Crude
OIL/NGL

1975 Net
Domestic
NATURAL GAS

23,374.0
16,344.0
10,782.2
13,003.6
7,424.0
10,248.6
13,166.0
5,800.0
9,488.8
5,115.6
3,543.8
4,036.8
3,010.2
4,332.6
4,634.2
3,132.0
1,258.6
1,084.6
852.6
1,160.0
684.4
765.6
N/A
580.0
342.2
26,332.0
585.8
365.4
324.8
713.4

23,198.7
15,872.0
7,101.4
10,936.3
6,736.9
7,341.1
12,820.5
7,782.4
3,449.9
4,198.4
7,354.4
5,462.0
3,2123
4,710.4
2,345.0
1,536.0
3,843.1
1,353.7
1,923.1
3,481.6
809.0
81.2
N/A
362.5
840.7
6,425.6
630.8
1,010.7
192.5
1,126.4

BTU's

1975
COAL

1975
URANIUM

199,332.0
47,460.0
23,730.0
61,698.0
82,206.0
59,325.0
53,890.8
47,460.0
316,795.5
-

7,525.0

34,400.0
1,290.0
8,600.0
5,375.0
10,750.0

-

40,341.0
-

237,300.0
8,780.1
66,444.0
18,984.0
21,357.0
-

2,150.0

62,350.0
2,150.0

-

Source: "Horizontal" Oil Company Divestiture and Separation Proposals, Exhibit IV-D. (Report to the American
Petroleum Institute, Oct. 15, 1976).

The impact of these incursions by the major oil companies into
the domain of substitute fuels is not difficult to conjecture. After all,
no man can be expected to compete with himself, nor can any man
be expected to serve two masters and be equally loyal to each. As
Walter Measday has observed:
Would Continental Oil encourage price and market competition between [its

subsidiary] Consolidation Coal and its traditional oil operations? Would
Union Oil push geothermal development in an area where it might cut into the

market for Union's fuel oil? The question extends to the exploitation of successful R & D. According to Senator Bartlett (R., Oklahoma), 49 of 52 patents
relating to coal gasification or liquefaction issued from 1964 to 1974 went to
oil companies. Let us make the highly unlikely assumption that an oil company with extensive foreign investments were to achieve a technological break25. Id. A recent compilation by the Federal Energy Administration of nonpetroleum
holdings by oil companies revealed the following:
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through which could make the United States self-sufficient in energy. Would
Exxon enjoy telling Sheik Yamani or would Occidental inform Col. Qadaffi
that no more Saudi Arabian or Libyan oil would be lifted for the U.S. market?
Or would there be some temptation to delay exploitation of the technology
until "it's really needed"?"5
NUMBER OF NONPETROLEUM HOLDINGS OF OIL COMPANIES

Number of Non-Petroleum Holdings

Oil Company

Atlantic-Richfield
Cities-Service
Continental
Exxon

12I

Gulf
Getty
M19

Mobil
Shell
Standard of Calif.
72

Standard of Indiana
Standard of Ohio

ME

Sun
Texaco
Phillips
Union of Calif.

Source: FEA, THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, A REPORT ON CORPORATE AND INDUSTRY
STRUCTURE (1975).

26. Measday, supra note 23, at 13. These questions are not entirely rhetorical. The oil
giants have a track record in the suppression of competing fuels. Jersey Standard's (Exxon)
handling of the hydrogenation patents, acquired pursuant to a cartel agreement with I.G.
Farben of Germany, is a case in point:
To Standard, these agreements promised, first, ownership and control, outside Germany, of IG's hydrogenation processes and any future IG processes for making synthetically products having similar uses to those of the customary petroleum refinery products,
from whatever raw material they might be derived; and, second, a junior partnership
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Such considerations lend force to current congressional attempts to
protect interfuel competition by prohibiting the oil companies from
27
further expansion into rival branches of the energy industry.
Finally, the government historically has done for the oil companies what they could not do for themselves without clear violations
of the antitrust laws. Under the guise of conservation and national
defense, the Bureau of Mines has set national output quotas, the
states have authorized prorationing schemes, and Congress has approved the Interstate Oil Compact and has legislated tariff protection and import quotas. In addition, the federal government has
subsidized the multinational giants with special tax offsets and both
the domestic and the multinational producers with magnanimous
depletion allowances. In war and peace and in times of crisis, real
or imagined, the government has favored the industry with antitrust
exemptions. The State Department, according to one analyst, has
with IG, outside Germany, in the manufacture of new chemical products derived from
petroleum or natural gas ...
Standard's use of its exclusive rights to IG's processes in the oil industry shows
clearly that its main object in acquiring them was to strengthen its control over the oil
industry. For the purpose, the IG agreements performed a dual function-defensive and
offensive. Acquisition of the hydrogenation rights eliminated the most serious threat
"... which has ever faced the company since the dissolution," according to Frank
Howard, the Standard official who played a leading role in the negotiations with IG.
Once these rights were safely acquired, Standard and Shell showed little disposition to
use them, or to encourage others to use them, in actual productive operations. Their
acquisition forestalled the threat to the oil industry of liquid fuels and lubricants from
coal . ..
Standard and Shell did little to encourage widespread synthetic production of liquid
fuels and lubricants from coal. They had acquired these processes primarily to protect
their own vast interests in petroleum. Standard summarized its policy as follows:
I.H.P. [International Hydrogenation Patents Company] should keep in close touch
with developments in all countries where it has patents, and should be fully informed
with regard to the interest being shown in hydrogenation and the prospect of its introduction. . . . It should not, however, attempt to stir up interest in countries where none
exists. If the Management decides that in any country the interest in hydrogenation is
serious, or that developments in such country are likely to affect I.H.P.'s position adversely, then I.H.P. should discuss the matter actively with the interested parties, and
attempt to persuade them that its process should be used ...
If coal, tar, etc., hydrogenation be feasible from an economic standpoint, or if it is
to be promoted for nationalistic reasons or because of some peculiar local conditions, it
is better for us as oil companies to have an interest in the development, obtain therefrom
such benefits as we can, and assure the distribution of the products in question through
our existing marketing facilities.
G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION 491-93 (1946) (footnotes omitted).

27. See, e.g., Interfuel Competition: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975);
Horizontal Integrationof the Energy Industry: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Energy of
the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Horizontal
IntegrationHearings].
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been the industry's law firm, the Interior Department its Washington office. 28 No wonder that the industry is sometimes depicted as
28. See R.
(1977); R.

ENGLER, THE BROTHERHOOD OF OIL: ENERGY PoLcY AND THE PUBuC INTEREST
THE POLITICS OF OIL: A STUDY OF PRIVATE POWER AND DEMOCRATIC

ENGLER,

(1961). The erstwhile description of the political influence of oil-according to
which "the Standard has done everything with the Pennsylvania legislature except to refine
it"-may no longer be apt, but the omnipresence of oil in the corridors of political power is
unshaken. Respectable men with bulging briefcases still penetrate the portals of government.
As Sampson reports, the oil companies contributed
generously to the Republican Party, and President Nixon's fundraisers, Maurice Stans
and Herbert Kalmbach, leaned heavily on them to help finance the notorious 1972
campaign. Four of the sisters contributed substantially, mostly through individuals.
Officials of Exxon gave $217,747 led by the chairman, Ken Jamieson ($2,500), the president Jim Garvin ($3,200) and the head of their Greek affiliate, Thomas Pappas ("the
Greek bearing gifts") ($101,672): while the Rockefeller family gave $268,000. Socal gave
$163,000, led by their chairman, Otto Miller ($50,000) and including $12,000 from John
McCone. Mobil gave only $4,300, and Texaco (whether through caution or meanness)
apparently gave nothing. By far the biggest contributor was Gulf whose offerings included a million dollars given clandestinely by Richard Mellon Scaife, a major Gulf
shareholder with his own political ambitions; and at least $100,000 which was produced
through the Bahamas subsidiary of Gulf by the chief lobbyist of the company, Claude
Wild. The eventual discovery of these illegal gifts, and of others, was to bring back all
the old public suspicions of the corruptions of oil money.
The global scope of the oil money, however, was not to emerge until 1975, when the
Securities and Exchange Commission began investigating political contributions. In
April 1975 Gulf were eventually compelled to admit, in their 1975 proxy statement, that
between 1960 and 1973 "approximately $10.3 million of corporate funds were used in the
United States and abroad for such purposes, some of which may be considered unlawful". Soon a succession of countries-Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador-demanded to
know whether their politicians had been bribed, and Peru even expropriated Gulf's
properties. Eventually the chairman of Gulf, Robert Dorsey, had to confess to having
paid bribes of $4 million from 1966 onwards to the ruling party in South Korea; and to
having given another $350,000, together with a helicopter, to the late General Barrientos
in Bolivia. The limelight then shifted to Exxon, whose chairman, Ken Jamieson, had to
admit in May 1975 that his company had made political contributions in Canada and
Italy; and a new uproar ensued.
SAMPSON, supra note 1, at 206-07. One indication that such efforts are not in vain is the
generous tax treatment Congress has accorded the oil industry over the years:
DIRECTIONS

U.S. TAXES PAID

BY THE AMERICAN SISTERS*

1972

Company
Exxon
Texaco
Mobil
Gulf
Socal

1962-1971

Net income
before taxes
($ billions)

%c paid
in U.S.
taxes

Net income
before taxes
($ billions)

% paid
in U.S.
taxes

3.700
1.376
1.344
1.009
0.941

6.5
1.7
1.3
1.2
2.05

19.653
8.702
6.388
7.856
5.186

7.3
2.6
6.1
4.7
2.7
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a government-sanctioned, government-protected, governmentto restrict output
subsidized cartel operating a finely tuned scheme
29
and maintain prices on a worldwide scale.
In summary, introduction of the "moderate" concentration ratios recorded in Table 1 as proof that the oil industry is competitive
in structure is disingenuous indeed. These ratios, as has been demonstrated, seriously understate the pervasive horizontal control exercised by the petroleum giants and, when simplistically accepted
at face value, conceal the worldwide dominance of these giants over
energy reserves.
III.

THE REINFORCEMENT OF SHARED MONOPOLY POWER THROUGH
VERTICAL INTEGRATION

Vertical integration by corporate giants is the capstone of control in the petroleum industry. As the mechanism for harnessing and
transmitting market power through the successive stages of production, refining, and marketing, vertical integration constitutes the
primary barrier to new competition. Specialized firms at any one
stage of the industry must live at the sufferance of the integrated
majors-vulnerable to the constant threat of price squeezes, the
denial of supply, and the foreclosure from markets. The very fact
of vertical integration, therefore, militates against workable competition in the petroleum industry and relegates competition to the
interstices and fringes of the marketplace.
For example, the combined effect of vertical integration and the
depletion allowance encouraged the integrated companies to report
their profits at the crude oil stage rather than at the refining or
marketing stage. The majors accomplishsd this objective by posting
a high price on crude oil, which they then sold to their own refineries
as well as to independents. For the vertically integrated companies,
the high price for crude was simply a bookkeeping transaction. Its
effect was to increase profits on crude, to reduce tax payments, and,
in spite of lower profits at the refining stage, to increase total profits
for the integrated concern. For the independent refiner, by contrast,
the increase in crude prices meant a decrease in both refining profits
*Source: MultinationalCorporationsand United States Foreign Policy: Hearings
Before the Senate Subcomm. on MultinationalCorporationsof the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Part 4, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 104
(1974), quoted in SAMPSON, supra note 1, at 205.
29. See, e.g., Horizontal Integration Hearings,supra note 27, at 108; INVESTIGATION OF
THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 6, at 27.
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and total profits; nonintegrated, he could not recoup the narrowed
margins in refining at some other stage of operations. 0
To illustrate, assuming a 27.5 percent depletion allowance, an
integrated concern that could supply seventy-seven percent of its
refinery needs with its own crude oil production stood to gain from
an increase in crude prices even if the increase was not passed on
at the refining stage. If the integrated company had a selfsufficiency ratio in excess of 38.5 percent, it stood to gain even if it
passed on only half of the crude oil price increase.' In other words,
an integrated company could decide to operate its refineries at zero
or subnormal profits and thus discipline, squeeze, or bankrupt the
nonintegrated refiners who are both its customers for crude and its
competitors in the sale of refined products. (Incidentally, fifteen of
the top seventeen refiners in the United States have a crude oil selfsufficiency ratio in excess of 38.5 percent. 2)
As the Federal Trade Commission concluded in its recent petroleum report, "The vertical integration system contained all the elements essential to a squeeze on refining profits and could be overcome only if the potential refining entrant could enter the industry
on a vertically integrated basis." 33 By thus raising the cost of entry
at the refining stage, vertical integration in and of itself becomes a
formidable entry barrier that few newcomers can afford to hurdle.
The system is also a barrier to established, independent refiners,
many of whom eventually give up the battle for survival and sell out
to their integrated rivals. (Incidentally, acquisitions of independent
refiners accounted for 40.7 percent of the increase in refining capac4
ity among the top twenty oil companies between 1959 and 1969.1 )
The control of pipelines by the vertically integrated majors
poses a similar problem. A pipeline rate set well above the competitive cost of transporting crude oil, for example, imposes no burden
on the majors who own the pipeline. For them, the high price is
simply a bookkeeping transaction involving a transfer of funds from
the refinery operation to the pipeline operation. To the nonintegrated refiner, however, an excessive pipeline charge is a real cost
increase that he cannot recoup elsewhere and that places him at a
6, at 12-31.
M. DE CHAZEAU & A. KAHN, INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY 221-22 (1959). See also Kahn, The Depletion Allowance in the Context of
Cartelization,54 AM. ECON. REV. 286-314 (1964).
32. INVESTIGATION OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 6, at 20.
33. Id. at 26.
34. Market Performanceand Competition in the Petroleum Industry: HearingsBefore
the Senate Comm. on Interiorand Insular Affairs, Part I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1664 (1973).
30.
31.

INVESTIGATION OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note
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competitive disadvantage vis--vis his integrated competitors.
The implications of the integrated majors' control over pipelines has been explained by Beverly Moore as follows:
Almost every one of the major pipeline systems constructed since World
War I is jointly owned by the few companies which dominate the marketing
areas which the pipelines serve. From the standpoint of the owners, the arrangement is perfectly natural.
If a few companies wish to exploit a market by constructing a joint venture
pipeline to it, they will have little interest in inviting all their actual and
potential competitors to come along with them. Likewise, the owners will have
an incentive to lay the line so that it or its feeder spurs will pass in close
proximity to their own refineries and marketing terminals, but not to those of
their nonowner competitors. The owners will have an incentive to provide
input and output facilities, storage tanks, and synchronization geared to their
own operations, but again not to those of their nonowner competitors.
The result is that, while joint venture pipelines are theoretically common
carriers, equally accessible to all, access can be substantially more expensive
for nonowners than for owners.
This initial disadvantage is widened by the fact that the nonowner must
pay the full rate or tariff while the owner actually pays only the pipeline cost,
recouping the difference through the pipeline company's dividend payments
to him. The rate-cost differential which measures this further degree of discrimination is commonly as high as 20 to 30 percent."

The integrated majors also can use their control of pipelines as
an entry barrier if they choose to exclude or limit flows of crude oil
to the independents. According to the Federal Trade Commission's
1973 report:
This can be done by (1) requiring shipments of minimum size, (2) granting
independents irregular shipping dates, (3) limiting available storage at the
pipeline terminal, (4) imposing unreasonable product standards upon inde35. Anticompetitive Impact of Oil Company Ownership of Petroleum Products Pipelines: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems of the
House Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1972). The argument that
pipelines are common carriers regulated by a government agency is hardly convincing when
one examines the following profits data:
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pendent
customers of pipelines, and (5) employing other harassing or delaying
36
tactics.

The companies controlling the pipelines control, to a large extent, the oil moving through those lines and determine the allocation of that oil among nonintegrated refiners. In addition, as Interstate Commerce Commission statistics for 1973 indicate, ninety-two
percent of the crude going into reporting lines was owned individually or jointly by the sixteen majors.37 Thus, through control of crude
oil supplies or through ownership of pipelines, vertical integration
gives the majors dominating the petroleum industry the power to
mollify, discipline, coerce, and exclude their nonintegrated rivals.
It empowers them to determine the conditions for entry and the
rules for survival in the petroleum industry.
The consequences of vertical integration by the major oil companies are particularly striking in the international sphere. The
PIPELINES: AVERAGE ANNUAL RETURN ON PAID-IN INVESTMENT, 1968-72
Average for all
manufacturing
corporations.*

17% 1119

Arapahoe

Colonial
Cook Inlet
24%

Four Corners

26%

Laurel
Olympic
Platte

59%
23%

Southcap
West Shore
West Texas Gulf

*FTC, QUARTERLY

l4

FINANCIAL REPORT FOR MANUFACTURING

CORPORATIONS

(1968-

72).
Source: ICC, TRANSPORT

STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, PIPELINES, PART 6,

(1968-72).

36.
37.

INVESTIGATION OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 6, at 26.
ICC, TRANSPORT STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, PIPELINES, PART 6, at 8-11 (1973).
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ability of OPEC to limit output and to maintain or raise its revenue
levels rests upon its ability to proration production cutbacks satisfactorily among its member countries. OPEC, in other words, needs
an agency to perform for it the same function as the Texas Railroad
Commission traditionally performed for the domestic industry. To
the extent that OPEC can rely upon the integrated oil companies
to serve as its prorationing and marketing agent or, in other words,
to the extent that it can rely upon these companies to exercise
coalescing rather than countervailing power, it can assure the viability of its worldwide control over oil prices. That the companies
more or less willingly have lent themselves to the attainment of that
objective was made clear by the Church Committee:
First, access to crude oil is the necessary precondition for an oil company
to stay in business. In a supply-limited situation a refiner without secure
access to crude is faced with the high probability of being unable to operate.
Second, the price at which OPEC sells oil to companies other than the traditional concessionaries has, up to this time at least, been somewhat higher than
the cost of similar oil to the established majors. One reason for this differential
has been that the established companies have continued to lift some part of
the oil produced within their concessions at tax paid cost, i.e., the cost of
production, plus royalties plus taxes rather than at the higher buyback price.
Finally, certain tax advantages which reduce the real cost of oil accrue to a
company from its ownership of equity oil in a foreign producer country. Thus,
for example, a company which lifts part of its foreign oil at tax paid cost may
presently credit the income tax portion of that cost against its U.S. tax liability
on other foreign income.
Multinational oil corporations are currently engaged in a series of negotiations designed to ensure their exclusive right to "buyback" oil-oil which has
become the property of the producer countries by virtue of the various participation "agreements", and which those countries now wish to sell back to the
previous company concession holders. The four Aramco shareholders-Exxon,
Texaco, Socal and Mobil-by joint negotiations seek to establish a special
relationship with Saudi Arabia which would give them preferential access to
the Saudi crude oil supply at a discount off the going market price, even should
that country acquire 100 percent of Aramco.
The multinational oil companies, on the other hand, provide the OPEC
with important advantages. As vertically-integrated corporations, the major
oil companies guarantee OPEC members an assured outlet for their production
in world markets. The primary concern of the established major oil companies
is to maintain their world market shares and their favored position of receiving
oil from OPEC nations at costs slightly lower than other companies. To maintain this favored status, the international companies help proration production
cutbacks among the OPEC members. Their ability to do this derives from the
existence of their diversified production base in OPEC countries.

The importance to the OPEC countries of maintaining common
38.

SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

NATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS

AND

MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS].

U.S.

93D

CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON MULTI-

FOREIGN POLICY 10

(1975) [hereinafter cited as
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interests with the integrated majors was not lost on the prime movers in the cartel. Said Sheik Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabia's Minister
of Petroleum:
* * * Nationalization of the upstream (production) operations would inevitably deprive the majors of any further interest in maintaining crude-oil price
levels. They would then become mere offtakers buying the crude oil from the
producing countries and moving it to their markets in Europe, Japan and the
rest of the world. In other words, their present integrated profit structure,
whereby the bulk of their profits are concentrated in the producing end, would
be totally transformed. With the elimination of their present profit margin of,
say, 40 cents a barrel from production operations, the majors would have to
make this up by shifting their profit focus downstream to their refining and
product-marketing operations. Consequently, their interest would be identical
with that of the consumers-namely, to buy crude oil at the cheapest possible
price.39

In other words, by avoiding nationalization of the integrated majors'
crude oil properties and instead entering into participation agreements with them, the companies would be given an incentive to
identify with OPEC interests rather than with the interests of consuming countries. In the words of Sir Eric Drake, the companies
would not only be the tax collectors for the producers;" they now
would be much closer partners, serving also as OPEC's prorationing
and marketing mechanism. In effect, as Professor M.M. Adelman
has stated, they would be the "agents of a foreign power."4
The Church Committee summed up the symbiotic relationship
between OPEC and the integrated majors in the following fashion:
Thus the current changeover from the concession system to exclusive long
term, large-volume supply contracts does not alter the interest that the international oil companies have in helping OPEC carry out its production and
pricing policies. So long as the individual OPEC countries have assured outlets
for their oil through exclusive joint arrangements with the major oil companies, the divisions within OPEC are unlikely to manifest themselves in lower
oil prices, even in the face of a worldwide surplus of crude oil productive
capacity estimated at over eight million barrels per day. There are, thus,
parallel interests between OPEC and the major oil companies in which the
by OPEC
companies ensure their access to the crude but
4 at the price imposed
regardless of a theoretical crude oil surplus. 1
39. Id. at 11.
40. SAMPSON, supra note 1, at 236.
41. Id. As Adelman put it to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "The cartel
governments use the multinational companies to maintain prices, limit production, and
divide markets. This connection, I submit, is the most strategic element in the world oil
market." Multinational Corporationsand United States ForeignPolicy: HearingsBefore the
Senate Subcomm. on MultinationalCorporationsof the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
Part 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975).
42. MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS, supra note 38, at 11.
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In short, the very logic of vertical integration has permitted the
Seven Sisters and the lesser international majors to enjoy a tenuous
co-habitation arrangement, if not an indissoluble marriage with the
OPEC producers.
The implications for consumer interests have been clearly
spelled out by Walter Measday:
So long as they can control the marketing of OPEC oil, the integrated
majors have little reason to oppose OPEC price increases. They can pass such
increases through into the prices of their own products secure in the knowledge
that competitors, who are also their customers, are not getting oil any cheaper.
They may, indeed, enjoy positive benefits from OPEC price increases through
the enhanced values of the reserves which they still possess.
The Prudhoe Bay field alone provides an example here. Each one dollar
increase in the value of a reserve barrel raises the North Slope assets of Exxon,
Atlantic Richfield and Sohio/BP by a minimum of $10 billion and probably
much more-the improvement in asset values is none the less real because it
is off-balance sheet. A good case can be made that had it not been for the
Arabs, the North Slope would have been a financial disaster, given the escalation in pipeline construction costs. As it is, a recent estimate forecasts profits
in the range of $2.00 a barrel for production delivered from this area. Similarly,
North Sea oil has been made profitable only through OPEC actions. There is,
in short, no great divergence-now that OPEC ownership of its own reserves
has been accepted-between the interests of the international majors and the
3
interests of OPEC member nations.

All that has happened since 1973 is the replacement of Seven Sisters
private cartel by a cartel of OPEC governments working hand-inglove with a consortium of vertically integrated international oil
giants.
IV.

VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND EFFICIENCY

In appearances before Congress and in releases to the media,
industry spokesmen are fond of picturing the vertical integration of
major oil companies as a finely tuned machine assuring a smooth
and continuous flow of materials from the crude fields to service
stations. Tampering with that machine, they claim, would make
coordination and planning of supply more difficult, would result in
wasteful duplication, would increase overhead costs, and generally
would entail sizable losses of efficiency. Vertical divestiture, they
say, would saddle consumers with higher costs for heating fuel and
gasoline.44
Little hard-core evidence supports these claims. Indeed, the
evidence produced by the integrated majors themselves points in
43. Measday, supra note 23, at 11.
44. See, e.g., Vertical IntegrationHearings, Part1, supra note 9, at 131 (testimony of
Frank Ikard).
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the opposite direction. First, there is no such thing as a continuous
flow from a major's crude field to its own refinery and through its
own marketing organization into its own branded gas pumps. As
was noted above, the major companies systematically exchange
crude as well as refined products through a system of simultaneous
purchases and sales agreements. An indeterminate and probably
modest proportion of a major's oil moves in a continuous flow
through its own vertical system. Exxon admitted as much in testimony before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee in
1975:
It is not possible to trace Exxon-owned feedstocks to each refinery. Exxon's
crude production is often commingled with purchased crude, part of the commingled stream sold to others, and some Exxon crude is sold outright. For
example, during 1974, Exxon's net crude plus condensate production was 701
[million barrels per day]. We purchased 868 [million barrels per day] from
others (including royalty oil), and we sold 780 [million barrels per day] to
others. 5

In other words, Exxon operates a crude oil business, supplied in part
from its own wells and in part by outside firms, and distributed in
part to Exxon's refineries and in part to other refiners.
Second, the majors repeatedly argue, when the argument suits
their purpose, that the functional components of their vertical organization operate quite independently from one another. Thus,
Exxon told the South Carolina Tax Commission:
Each of these functions is managed and accounted for on a functional
operating basis. Each is a segment of [Exxon's] total corporate enterprise, but
each has its own accounting, budgeting and forecasting, its own management
and staff, its own profit center, its own investment center, its own physical
facilities, etc. The profit or loss of each function is separately and accurately
computed."

Similarly, before the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission, Exxon
argued:
[N]one of [Exxon's] functional departments are integral parts of a unitary
business composed of all functions combined; rather it [Exxon] will show that
45. The Industrial ReorganizationAct: Hearings on the Energy Industry Before the
Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Part

9, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 529 (1975). Professor Adelman underscored this point in his assessment of the logic of vertical integration in petroleum:
The industry's job, of arranging an immense flow of sticky combustible liquids, is
made no easier or harder by common ownership of the segments. A company that on
paper is balanced and produces "enough" crude for its own use actually has to dispose
of much of most of it to others. Oil is where you find it, scattered in thousands of fields
all over the country or the world. It often doesn't pay to bring it home.
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY COMPTTON AcT REPORT, supra note 2, at 125.
46.

Vertical Integration Hearings,Part 2, supra note 9, at 1174.
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each function is independent and not unitary to, or an integral part of, any
other function. 7

Apparently oblivious of the industry's claim that divestiture
would result in the wasteful multiplication of company headquarters, one of Exxon's senior vice presidents explained the organization of his company's production, refining, and marketing departments to the Wisconsin Commission as follows:
[Elach of the operating departments had its own separate management responsible for the proper conduct of that operation. Each of these management
managers had a technical staff to provide all the supporting technical service
that he needed to operate his particular operation. He also had the administrative staff when necessary to assist him. Each of these departments had its own
separate and distinct field organization which conducted the operations in the
field.
[Wihen all these elements are taken together the entire organization of
each of these separate functional segments is designed to permit them to
operate independently and separate from each other segment . . . [T]hey
were on a self-sufficient basis, except . . . the availability of some of the
Coordination and Service Departments which was provided at the corporate
level. These departments were free to consult with those staff departments, if
they felt it was necessary.'"

Equally revealing is the testimony of Dr. Ezra Solomon, a former member of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, appearing on behalf of Exxon before the Wisconsin Commission. Dr.
Solomon gave the following answers in response to questioning by
Exxon's counsel:
Q. Do you have an opinion ..
as to whether Humble [i.e., Exxon] was
a unitary company?
A. No, by my definition. If it is integrated, it is by definition not unitary.
Q. And on the same basis do you have an opinion as to whether the
functional operations of the Humble Exploration and Production Department,
the Refining Department and the Marketing Department were carried on as
separate businesses?
A. Yes, there are three separate unitary businesses, and if I remember
right, there were even more, but these are the major important stages that a
vertically integrated7 company combines.
Q. Each stage, E and P, Refining and Marketing, you would say were
separate businesses?
A. Yes.
Q. On the same basis do you have an opinion as to whether or not the
Wisconsin Marketing operations were an integral part of the Humble E and P
function?
A. No, they are not.
Q. Did you find any economic dependence between the Wisconsin operation and the E and P Department?
47.
48.

Id. at 1229-30.
Id. at 1285, 1293.
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A. No, none whatever. It appears that Humble's E and P Department
was a functioning unit even before there were any Wisconsin operations.
[Dr. Solomon] A. Could Humble's E and P Department sever its relationship with the Wisconsin operation without affecting the Wisconsin
operation?
[Mr. Ragatz] Q. Right.
A. Yes, I imagine it could.
Q. And could the Wisconsin Marketing operations have been severed
without damage to the E and P function?
A. Yes, the Wisconsin Marketing end of it didn't exist for a while, and
after it existed, it could have been severed without affecting the E and P
viability.
Q. Now, on the same basis as I previously asked, do you have an opinion
as to whether the Wisconsin Marketing operations were during the years in
issue an integral part of the Humble Refining Department?
A. They were not.
Q. Was there any economic dependence in that relationship?
A. Not that one could see from the record at all. The Refining Department was a unitary business that could have functioned with or without the
Wisconsin Marketing.
Q. And so there was no-or the Department could have been feasibly
economically severed without damaging the Wisconsin Marketing operations?
A. You could have a Wisconsin Marketing operation without having a
Refining Department.
Q. Then in other words, there was an ample supply of products without
obtaining them from Humble Refining?
A. That's correct.
Q. Could the Wisconsin Marketing operations have been feasibly economically severed without damaging Humble's Refining Department
operations?
A. Yes.
Q. So there was an ample demand for Humble's Refining product without the Wisconsin market?
A. Yes.
Q. And going back to the E and P Department for a minute, I take it
that in the market there would be an ample demand for crude oil without the
Humble Refining Department being in the picture so that Humble's E and P
Department could have disposed of its crude oil produced?
A. Yes. Many companies exist as crude oil producers.
Q. And as to the Refining Department, there was an ample supply of
crude oil in the market so that the Refining Department was not economically
dependent upon Humble's E and P Department?
A. Not in the sense that I am using the word here.
Q. And the two departments could have been economically severed on
a feasible basis?
A. The very fact that refineries exist as independent refineries and producers exist as independent producers and on a fairly large scale suggests that
this can be done.'

Later, after counsel for the State of Wisconsin had finished his
cross-examination, Exxon's counsel resumed his questioning of Dr.
Solomon:
49. Id. at 1739-42.
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Q. Professor Solomon, on cross-examination you were asked questions
that seemed to be driving at a dependent relationship between separate functions of an integrated oil company. Would you comment on the concept of
dependence in terms of demand and supply in the market itself as to whether
or not everybody in business has some dependency on market conditions and
distinguish that from an economic dependency in terms of the concept of
unitary?
A. Well, in the case of a unitary business, the degree of dependence
between the subcomponents that comprise that unit are very strong. They are
essential, they are necessary. You could not feasibly run it in today's economy,
or whatever economy we are talking about, without all of those components.
In the case of a vertically-integrated company, the presence of business
or unitary businesses within the vertical combination, the dependence is not
as strong at all. It is quite a bit weaker. There is, obviously, some advantage
for each unitary business belonging in a family of businesses. Size alone does
provide some help. That degree of dependence is sort of trivial compared to
the interdependence within each unit itself.
Q. In the market could you say that the dependence for a refinery would
be that there be a supply of crude in the general market itself and that there
not be a dependence between ownership of a producing function and a refining
function?
A. Well, the common ownership of the two functions is not all that
important in terms of the demand and supply of the flow of product, eithercrude or the products that come out of them. There is a well-established
market for crude petroleum. It has a daily quotation. A refinery can buy there,
a crude producer can sell there. Likewise, at the refined end there is a clear
cut market for petroleum products in which a lot of people engage and in which
there are daily quotations so that the degree of dependence is not that great
at all.
Q. In other words the refinery can get crude from market sources that
have no ownership relationship to the refinery and, in turn, can sell its product
to the market sources that have no ownership relationship to the refinery?
A. Quite. The total demand and supply for crude is balanced. It really
doesn't matter where you get it. It's the same kind of thing and you get it at
the same price anyway."
"Truth," it seems, depends upon the forum in which the majors
happen to be testifying. In one case, vertical integration is indispensable for efficiency and cost minimization; in another, it does not
seem to make much difference.
Professor M.M. Adelman, who, incidentally, does not support
vertical divestiture, has made perhaps the most forthright judgment
of the industry's efficiency argument:
The industry's contention, that vertical integration helps efficiency, is
unfounded. Common ownership of these activities, by one company, neither
saves money nor costs any. (There are bound to be some exceptions to the rule;
relatively, they are unimportant.) Most companies became integrated long ago
for reasons that are now history. They have stayed integrated because there is
no reason to change. 51
50. Id. at 1750-52.
51. Washington Post, April 30, 1976, § D, at 9, col. 7, quoted in PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
CoMPETITION Acr REPORT, supra note 2, at 139.
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In addition, interposing genuine markets between successive stages
of the oil industry would not impair efficient operations. Given past
experience, however, such markets certainly would enhance competition by lowering the entry barriers to newcomers at all levels of the
industry.

V. THE FEASIBILITY OF DIVESTITURE
After extensive hearings on S. 2387, the Senate Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly concluded that divestiture of the vertically integrated petroleum majors is not only desirable, but feasible.52 Divestiture is technically feasible because, as has been noted
already, the majors operate their departments as functionally separate units. Several companies, including Gulf, Sun, and Continental, already have restructured their organizations to place production activities within wholly owned subsidiaries that are separate
from other functional subsidiaries. Other companies have a similar
functional separation in their organizations, although they operate
through separate divisions rather than through distinct subsidiaries.
In other words, they already have accomplished technical divestiture as a result of internal management decisions. As counsel for
Exxon told the Wisconsin Tax Appeal Commission:
The evidence will show that Humble [Exxon] was organized on a functionally independent basis, and that its separate functions were operated as
separate businesses in competition with other oil companies having similar
functions and other companies which only operated in the business activity of
a particular function.
We intend to develop through the evidence the functional independence
of the various departments.5 3

As for the financial feasibility of divestiture, courts are fully
equipped to handle the remedy's problems-problems no less routine than those arising from bankruptcies and voluntary spinoffs in
cases of corporate reorganizations. As one expert in the field told the
Subcommittee,
All of the activity which I have described in general terms should provide
us with a measure of comfort, in that we are not without the requisite legal,
accounting and financial expertise to accomplish complex corporate transactions of substantial magnitude without making economic tidal waves and
without transcending the constitutional limitations of due process and on deprivation of property rights. These have been accomplished in the main, without denigrating the rights of shareholders, debtholders, or other creditors and
52.
53.

supra note 2, at 147-50.
Vertical IntegrationHearings,Part 2, supra note 9, at 1219-20.
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where the rights of shareholders, debtholders or creditors have been affected,
our judicial system has adequately dealt with these situations."

Experience with the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
indicates that massive divestiture can take place without crippling
the reorganized industry, damaging the efficiency of its operations,
or riding roughshod over the interests of stockholders or creditors.15
Rearranging stockholder equities would be the simplest problem. If past practice is followed, the petroleum majors would be
reorganized into functional subsidiaries whose stock would either be
sold off or, more likely, distributed to existing stockholders with the
proviso, of course, that the interests controlling the company before
divestiture would not control more than one of the functionally
separate successor companies. Management of the corporate debt,
issued with the backing of the full faith and credit of a corporate
entity that is to be altered substantially by divestiture, would pose
a stickier problem. Debt under covenants of this type clearly might
have to be refinanced. If securities issued in the past at a relatively
low rate of interest must be refinanced at a time when interest rates
are higher, the major concern would be the effect on the embedded
cost of a company's debt. As Walter Measday points out, however,
such problems are not insoluble:
An example of one such solution is the recent divestiture of Northwest
Pipeline by El Paso, which affected 26 series of El Paso's long-term debt. By
court order, each of these series was replaced by an El Paso issue and a Northwest issue bearing the same maturities as the original series but with a 1/8
percent higher interest rate "to sweeten the deal." The ratio between the two
companies' debt is the proportion between the taxable basis of properties
retained by El Paso and those transferred to Northwest. In other words, an
investor in El Paso 5's issued in 1962 and maturing in 1982 now holds El Paso
5-1/8's and Northwest 5-1/8's, still maturing in 1982. The increase in interest
rate is minor compared to the inflation in rates since 1962, while the value of
the securities to investors has been enhanced."

Such problems, although obviously not devoid of complexity,
clearly are soluble without prejudice to investor interests.
Moreover, companies threatened with divestiture would not
likely find the raising of needed funds in the capital market an
impossible task. For example, Georgia Pacific, which was the subject of an FTC divestiture action, was able to raise nearly 500 million dollars in debt on favorable terms in the short period between
54. Id., Part3, at 2049.
55. Study of Monopoly Power, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Study of Monopoly
Power, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1339-53, 1460-69 (1949).
56. Measday, supra note 23, at 21-22.
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the announcement of the FTC's complaint and the spinoff of
Louisiana-Pacific pursuant to a voluntary consent settlement. 5
Similarly, in the six years between the filing of the FTC's complaint
against Kennecott, in which the government sought divestiture of
Peabody Coal, the company raised at least 700 million dollars on
terms at least as favorable as those available to most other large
corporations. Indeed, six months after the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in the case, Kennecott obtained a revolving credit of 250
million dollars-at the prime rate for two years and thereafter at
one-fourth above the prime rate until the last two years of the loan,
during which an interest charge one-half above the prime rate was
to be in effect. 8 The investment community apparently views the
"uncertainties" of divestiture with considerably more equanimity
than many other risks to which its business clients may be subject. 9
A vertical divestiture action against the petroleum majors
should be an even less than average cause for concern. Contrary to
the industry's dire forebodings about "disintegration" and "dismemberment"-implying that the majors would be broken down
to the size of the neighborhood gasoline station-the successor
companies still would be corporate entities of impressive size and
power. In the words of the Senate Subcommittee:
Exxon was the largest U.S. manufacturing company, in terms of 1974
assets, on the Fortune "500" list. Divested, Exxon's manufacturing-refining,
chemicals, etc.-and marketing assets would have totaled about $15.8 billion,
surpassed only by General Motors-$20.5 billion. Exxon's producing operations-$10.5 billion in assets-would have been in sixth place-behind General
Motors, Exxon manufacturing and marketing, Ford, IBM, and, by a narrow
margin, I.T.&T. Exxon Pipe Line Co., with assets of $709 million, would have
been nearly within the top 200 companies.
Marathon Oil, smallest of the majors in assets, ranked No. 77 on this
basis among U.S. companies in 1974. The surviving producing operation$883 million in assets-would still have been among the top 200 companies,
as would refining and marketing-$751 million. Even Marathon Pipe Line
Co.'s assets-$102 million-were within the range spanned by the 500 largest
companies.6

If the successor companies resulting from divestiture of the petroleum giants were to find survival difficult or if they were to find
raising capital impossible in spite of sound management, the 99.8
percent of United States manufacturing firms that are smaller than
those successors must abandon hope.
57.
58.
59.
60.

PETROLEUM INDUSTRY COMPETITION Acr

REPORT,

supra note 2, at 134-35.

Id. at 133-34.
Measday, supra note 23, at 22.
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY COMPETITION AcT REPORT, supra note 2, at 132-33.
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CONCLUSION

In its report on S. 2387, the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended that the eighteen vertically integrated petroleum giants be
reorganized into separate producing and refining-marketing companies and that all pipelines be reconstituted as independent common
carriers having no interest in the crude oil and products being transported through them.6 ' The Committee assured the Senate that the
proposed divestiture could be accomplished:
Without the loss of managerial and operating efficiencies;
Without inhibiting needed capital investments;
Without injuring investors in the companies;
Without inhibiting the timely growth of energy supplies.2

The Committee expressed the confidence that implementation
of its divestiture proposal would:
Allow the development of free markets in crude and products;
Bring about increased efficiencies in the industry;
Deliver products and services at the best prices to consumers;
Protect the independent refiners and marketers from extinction without
requiring Government intervention;
Remove the Government from various phases of the industry's operation;
Put pressure on the operation of the OPEC cartel;
Forestall the nationalization of the oil industry. 63

In the light of available evidence, these contentions seem eminently
reasonable, especially because the policy alternatives to divestiture-the status quo, governmental regulation, or nationalization-clearly are deficient in protecting the public interest.
61. Id. at 5.
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id.

